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STATEMENT OF FACTS

In her brief on appeal, Appellee Vicki Christensen ("Christensen") provides her
own "Statement of Relevant Facts" (see Christensen's Brief, pp. 2-6). Christensen cites
directly to the District Court's Order [R. 546 passim.] for the facts presented. The
majority of these enumerated facts are in accord with the Appellant Reed Brasher's
("Brasher") own Statement of Facts as set forth in his initial Brief.
However, in his initial Brief, Brasher clarifies and provides context for some of

G

the District Court's findings of fact while actually disputing three of the District Court's
findings of fact. Specifically, Brasher reiterates the following points of clarification and

Q

disputed facts enumerated in Christensen's Brief:
Fact statement 8: The Offer to Purchase required Brasher to pay $5,000.00

"Earnest Money deposit paid to Owner with this Offer." Brasher indicated during the
meeting that he had the check to leave the $5,000.00 earnest money, but did not do so.
~

[Christensen Brief, p. 4, ,I 8].
Brasher's response: The Offer to Purchase did not specify any date by which
earnest money was required to be paid. Furthermore Brasher planned on paying
Christensen at the meeting, but Christensen said that she wanted to speak with her family
and attorney about the Offer to Purchase before accepting payment of the earnest money.
Brasher testified that each time he called Christensen during March 2013 his intent was to
arrange to drop off the earnest money payment to Christensen. [Brasher Brief, p. 16, ,I,I
38(c), 39, 56].

Q

Page 3 of23

Fact statement 9: During the meeting, Brasher filled out the WUA himself. The
terms "payable 3/15 each year" was not filled in at the March 13, 2013 meeting, nor was
the term "2018. " Christensen told Brasher at the meeting that the water would only be
leased to him on a year-to-year basis. Brasher took the WUA with him when he left the
meeting, and never provided a copy to Christensen.
Brasher' s response: The only testimony in support of this finding of fact was
~

Christensen's friend, Nedra Swasey (who was present at the March 13, 2013 meeting).
Brasher points out in his Brief that Swasey indicated that she "could not remember" when
~

initially asked about which portions of the WUA were not filled in at the March 13, 2013
meeting. Swasey also could not remember an ending date of 2018 in the WUA, but
nonetheless argued that Christensen would not "ever" lease water to anybody for such an
extended period of time. With respect to the term "2018," Swasey said that she did "not
believe it was filled in when that paper left [Christensen's] home." All of these
statements are qualified in that Swasey admits she did not "remember" or that she did not
"believe." [Brasher Brief, pp. 18-20].
Christensen herself acknowledged that the "payable 3/15 each year" was the date
of payment indicated on the 2013 WUA. Christensen also admitted during trial that if
Brasher had purchased the property, she should would have rented the water to him for a
"few years." This admission contravenes Swasey's statements and assumptions about
what Christensen was willing to do as far as the lease term. [See Brasher Brief, p. 20].

Q>

Brasher testified that during the March 13, 2013 meeting, he left the ending date
for the lease blank, but explained to Christensen why he needed the water for a period of
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years (rather than just one year). Brasher also testified without qualification (unlike
Swasey) that the term "Payable 3-15 of each year" was written in by him and that the
term "2018" was written in by Christensen before he left the March 13, 2013 meeting.
Brasher also noted that the handwriting of the term "2018" is not consistent with his
writing and that it looked similar to Christensen's writing. Brasher affirmatively stated
that he witnessed Christensen write the term "2018" in. [See Brasher Brief, pp. 20-21].
With respect to the finding that "Christensen told Brasher at the meeting that the
water would only be leased to him on a year-to-year basis" the only testimony in support

of this was given by Swasey at trial. However, as previously noted, Christensen

G

acknowledged that she was willing to enter into a lease for a "few years." Furthermore,
Brasher gave unequivocal testimony that he saw Christensen fill in the term "2018" in the
2013 WUA while at the March 13 meeting.
Fact statement 10: Brasher left a check for Christensen in the amount of
$1,290.00 for the lease of the water shares. However, Christensen told Swasey prior to
the March 13, 2013 meeting that should [sic] would not lease Brasher he water shares
unless he bought the farm. Christensen believed the offer to lease was contingent upon
she and Brasher finalizing the offer to sell the farm.

Brasher's response: Brasher admits that he left a check for Christensen in the
amount of $1,290.00 for the lease of the water shares-and Christensen accepted that
payment.
In her Brief, Christensen does not cite to the record where the Court found "that
Christensen told Swasey prior to the March 13, 2013 meeting that she would not lease
Page 5 of23

Q

Brasher he water shares unless he bought the farm." The District Court's final Order [R.
546-551] does not appear to indicate such a finding of fact. In any case, Brasher
demonstrates at length in his initial brief that Christensen's clear (and repeated) testimony
at trial was that that the 2013 WUA was not in any way an integrated part of the Offer to
Purchase and that the two documents were not interdependent. [See Brasher Brief, pp.
28-30].

Fact statement 11: During the meeting, both parties signed the WUA and the
Offer to Purchase Real Estate. Christensen told Brasher that before anything was finally
@>

[sic], she had to discuss both offers with her family and attorney. Christensen never
cashed the check for the water shares.
Brasher's response: As pointed out by Brasher in his initial Brief, there is
absolutely no evidence from the trial transcript or in record that Christensen stated that
she had to discuss "both" offers with her family and attorney before accepting. On the
contrary, all of the evidence indicates that Christensen only discussed taking the Offer to
Purchase to her attorney and family (not the WUA). [See Brasher Brief, pp. 22-23]. This
distinction is important because the District Court in its findings of fact conflates the
Offer to Purchase and the WUA and assumes that Christensen needed to discuss both
documents with her family and attorney, when in fact, that Christensen's acceptance of
the WUA was not conditioned upon her subsequent discussions with family and legal
counsel.
While Brasher admits that Christensen held onto the check for the 2013 WUA
lease, Christensen never informed Brasher that she hadn't cashed Brasher's check.
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Furthermore, Brasher was not concerned because the pnor year (2012), it took
Christensen six weeks before she cashed the check for the water use. [See Brasher Brief,
p. 14,, 52].

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

The evidence clearly establishes that the parties did have a meeting of the minds
with respect to the lease of the water under the 2013 WUA.

II.

The 2013 Water Use Authorization independently meets the requirements of a
contract. Alternatively, the 2013 Water Use Authorization memorializes the
underlying oral agreement of the parties.

III.

Three of the District Court's Findings of Fact are not supported by evidence.

IV.

Promissory estoppel is a viable cause of action because Christensen's own
testimony and actions demonstrate that the water use was not conditioned upon
Brasher purchasing Christensen's farm.
ARGUMENT

I.

The evidence establishes that the parties did have a meeting of the minds.

Christensen asserts that the District Court properly determined that there was no
meeting of the minds sufficient to create a binding contract. [Christensen Brief, pp. 8-1 0].
Christensen correctly points out that the parties to any contract must have a
meeting of the minds and that the analysis depends on whether the parties "actually
intended to contract."
Christensen next argues that Brasher has not "marshaled evidence in contesting
this particular finding by the District Court" (i.e. the finding that there was "no meeting
Page 7 of23

of the minds.") Christensen suggest that Brasher has only argued that the District Court
got "tangled up" in the Offer to Purchase the farm and missed the separate oral agreement
between Brasher and Christensen that was memorialized by the 2013 WUA. [Christensen
@

Brief, p. 8].
Initially, Brasher notes that the District Court properly treated the "meeting of the
minds" issue as a conclusion of law, not a finding of fact. [R. 550].
Whether a "meeting of the minds" occurred is actually a legal conclusion based on
several cumulative, subsidiary "facts." 1 In this case, the questions directly affecting

@

whether or not a meeting of the minds occurred include: (1) whether the 2013 WUA was
conditioned upon acceptance of the Offer to Purchase; (2) whether Christensen told
Brasher prior to canceling the 2013 WUA that the lease of water shares was conditioned
upon acceptance of the Offer to Purchase; (3) whether the WUA contains terms sufficient
to define the parties' intentions; (4) whether Brasher tendered adequate payment for the
lease of shares and whether Christensen accepted that tender; (5) whether logical
inconsistencies arise by assuming that the Offer to Purchase and the 2013 WUA were
interdependent.
Addressing these five points in order, it becomes clear that Christensen and
Brasher did have a meeting of the minds. Christensen cannot make a mere ex post facto
1

Under basic contract law principles, a contract is not formed without a meeting of the
minds. Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977). "Contractual mutual
assent requires assent by all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their
minds meet as to all the terms." Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah
1978). Determining whether a meeting of the minds occurred requires an examination of
the agreement at issue and the circumstances under which the agreement was entered
into. Crismon v. Western Co., 742 P.2d 1219, 1221-22 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Page 8 of23

decision to renege on the 2013 WUA and then claim that she never had a meeting of the
minds with Brasher. Such a position is self-serving and is against the clear weight of

<ii>

evidence in this case.
(1)

The 2013 WUA was not conditioned upon acceptance of the Offer to

Purchase.

While the District Court found that based on evidence presented at trial

"Christensen believed the water lease was part of the Farm sale" and that "Christensen
did not intend to lease the water to Brasher unless he purchased the Farm .... " [R. 550],
there is no evidence to support this position. Brasher demonstrates (at length) that
Christensen testified that the Offer to Purchase and WUA were not interdependent on
each other. [Brasher Brief, pp. 28-30]. Christensen acknowledges in her Brief that the
2013 WUA and Offer to Purchase were separate documents and that neither document
references the other. [Christensen Brief, p. 9]. In fact, Christensen points to no evidence
in testimony or in the record (other than the District Court's finding-which is
challenged on appeal) to support the proposition that the 2013 WUA was conditional
based on an acceptance of the Offer to Purchase.
(2)

There is no evidence in trial testimony that Christensen told Brasher prior

to canceling the 2013 WUA that the lease of water shares was conditioned upon
acceptance of the Offer to Purchase.
(3)

The WUA contains terms sufficient to define the parties' intentions.

Brasher has argued this position at length in his initial Brief. [Brasher Brief, pp. 24-27].
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(4)

There is no dispute that Brasher tendered adequate payment for the lease of

shares and Christensen accepted that tender at the March 13, 2013 meeting. [Brasher
Brief, p. 14, 1 48].
(5)

Several logical inconsistencies arise by assuming that the Offer to Purchase

and the 2013 WUA were interdependent. First, if such an assumption is made, the 2013
WUA becomes an unnecessary redundancy because there would have been no reason for
Christensen to sign the 2013 WUA or accept payment for the lease of 215 shares if the
sale of the Property was requisite. This is true because the sale would have resulted in
;,iJ

Brasher receiving all of Christensen's shares associated with the property-far in excess
of what he needed. Second, the Offer to Purchase anticipated a closing no later than
December 1, 2013. If permission to lease the water was conditioned on the purchase of
the Farm by Brasher, the 2013 WUA would necessarily have been held in abeyance until
closing had actually occurred up to December 1, 2013 thereby rendering the 2013 WUA
useless during the entire 2013 irrigation season.
In her Brief, Christensen cites to four "facts" that support her contention that there
was no meeting of the minds:
(1)

Brasher tried at least three times in early 2013 to lease Christensen's water.
Christensen initially declined these three times.

(2)

Brasher and Christensen met one time on March 13, 2013 to discuss leasing
the water and the purchase of Christensen's property.
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(3)

At the meeting, Christensen allegedly told Brasher she need to discuss both
the Offer to Purchase and the 2013 WUA with her family and attorney
before anything was final.

(4)

After the meeting Brasher could not initially reach Christensen and she did
not cash his check. [Christensen Brief, p. 9].

Christensen relies on these four points to argue that Christensen was not "very
interested" in leasing the water to Brasher. Christensen also asserts that the lease was
conditioned upon the purchase of the property and that Christensen needed to speak with
her family and attorney before "anything was final." [Christensen Brief, pp. 9-1 O].
It should be readily apparent that facts (1), (2) and (4) as enumerated by

Christensen are entirely irrelevant in determining whether the parties had a meeting of the
minds. The undisputed facts are: ( 1) Christensen did meet with Brasher on March 13,
2013, (2) Christensen and Brasher did execute the 2013 WUA, (3) Brasher did tender
payment for the 2013 WUA and Christensen did accept Brasher's check at the March 13,
2013 meeting, and (4) Christensen did allow Brasher to leave with the 2013 WUA in
hand.
Furthermore with respect to fact (3 ), Christensen never told Brasher that she
needed to have her family and attorney review the 2013 WUA before accepting it. [See
Brasher Brief, pp. 22-23]. It is absurd to suggest that the 2013 WUA was not accepted by
Christensen when all of her actions demonstrate that she signed and delivered the 2013
WUA to Brasher at the March 13, 2013 meeting. One has to reasonably question why
Christensen even entertained Brasher, accepted his payment, executed the 2013 WUA
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and released it to Brasher to be filed with HCIC if the entire transaction was merely a
"proposition."

II.

The 2013 Water Use Authorization independently meets the requirements of
a contract. Alternatively, the 2013 Water Use Authorization memorializes the
underlying oral agreement of the parties.
Christensen contends that 2013 WUA does not contain the required elements to
qualify as an enforceable contract. [Christensen Brief, pp. 11-12]. In support of this

~

position, Christensen argues five points: ( 1) the 2013 document is a form between the
water owner and HCIC and is not an agreement between a water owner and lessee; (2)
the WUA is a "directive" from a water owner to HCIC because the water owner already
has a "lease and/or other agreement" that defines the terms between the water owner and
the lessee; (3) there is no language of offer or acceptance in the WUA; (4) there is no
consideration for the WUA, and ( 5) there is no defined term for the WUA.
Brasher responds to each of the five points as follows:
(1)

The WUA is a form document required by HCIC-but that does not mean

that the WUA is not a contract (or a writing embodying a verbal understanding between
parties). Almost every witness during trial (including Christensen) referred to the WUA
as an actual "lease." [Brasher Brief p. 17, 1 67].
(2)
~

~

While the WUA may be considered a "directive" (Christensen does not cite

to the record or testimony to support this assertion), such an appellation does not mean
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the WUA is not also a contract. Brasher has set forth the reasons why the WUA can and
should be considered an enforceable contract. [Brasher Brief, pp. 24-27].
(3)

Christensen argues that the WUA does not contain the language of "offer or

acceptance." However, the form WUA contains the language "in accordance with a lease
and/or other agreement" and provides that a party is "authorizing" the other party to "call
for" a specific issuance of water shares. Furthermore, at the bottom of the WUA, the
following language appears: "If the conditions of this agreement change, I will contact
Huntington Cleveland Irrigation Company office and modify, or terminate this
agreement." (Emphasis added). This verbiage establishes that the WUA is most certainly
represents an "agreement" between the parties.
(4)

Although the WUA does not include a specific line listing the price for the

lease, the WUA (as Christensen readily acknowledges) contemplates that the parties have
reached an accord, whether pursuant to a "lease or other agreement" for an agreed-on
price. It is undisputed that the parties agreed upon a lease price of $1,290.00 for both
2012 and 2013. Therefore, consideration was contemplated and agreed to, even if the
price itself is not listed in the WUA.
(5)

Christensen argues that the 2013 WUA contains two options relative to the

terms of the lease, and that neither box was checked. According to Christensen, this
means that no "term" was agreed to. Brasher has argued at length in his initial Brief that
the terms for the 2013 WUA were written in by Christensen during the March 13, 2013
meeting. [Brasher Brief, pp. 18-21]. However, even if no term was written in at the
meeting, Christensen has cited the testimony of her friend, Nedra Swasey. At trial Nedra
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Swasey said "Yes, Vikki told [Brasher] it would be on a year-to-year basis. [TT: 205: 18206: 19]. [Christensen Brief, p. 16]. Therefore, even assuming that the term of years for
the 2013 WUA were not written in at the March 13, 2013 meeting, Christensen was
aware that the term was at least one year.
Christensen next argues that the 2013 WUA was not integrated and that the 2013
WUA actually contains an "anti-integration" because it assumes an underlying lease
and/or other agreement. [Christensen Brief, p. 13]. Brasher has already addressed this
issue at length in his initial Brief. [Brasher Brief, pp. 37-39].

III.

Three of the District Court's Findings of Fact are not supported by evidence.

Brasher has challenged three of the District Court's "findings of fact," namely:
(1)

The finding that Brasher filled out the 2013 WUA by adding the term
"payable 3/15 each year" and the term "2018."

(2)

The finding that Christensen told Brasher during the March 13, 2013
meeting that the water would only be leased to him on a year-to-year basis.

(3)

The finding that Christensen told Brasher at the March 13, 2013 meeting
that she needed to discuss "both" the Offer to Purchase and the 2013 WUA
with her family before anything was final. [Brasher Brief, pp. 18-23].

With respect to the alleged additional terms written in by Brasher after the March
13, 2013 meeting, Brasher has pointed at that Swasey's testimony at trial was vague
insofar as she first stated that she could not remember which portions of the 2013 WU A
were filled out. This was in stark contrast to Brasher's testimony which was clear and
definite. Brasher stated that the term "Payable 3-15 of each year" was written in by him
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at the March 13, 2013 meeting and that Christensen herself wrote in the term "2018"
based on Brasher's explanation as to why he need a five-year lease. Moreover, Swasey's
"certainty" that Christensen would not "ever" lease her water for a five-year period is
directly contradicted by Christensen who said she would have leased the water for a "few
years" if Brasher had purchased her property. 2 [Brasher Brief, p. 19-21].
As to the finding that Christensen told Brasher during the March 13, 2013 meeting
that the water would only be leased to him on a year-to-year basis, Brasher has pointed to
the fact that Christensen stated that she was contemplating a multi-year lease conditioned
upon Brasher's purchase of the Property. Brasher also testified that Christensen was the
one who filled in the term "2018" during the March 13, 2013 meeting. [Brasher Brief, pp.
21-22].
Concerning the finding that Christensen told Brasher at the March 13, 2013
meeting that she needed to discuss "both" the Offer to Purchase and the 2013 WUA with
her family before anything was final, Christensen has provided her own testimony in
support of this finding. [Christensen Brief, pp.17-18]. Importantly, however, none of
these quotes from Christensen's trial testimony ever indicate that Christensen told
Brasher at the March 13, 2013 meeting that she needed to have the 2013 WUA reviewed
(as opposed to the Offer to Purchase). The only statement that Christensen made at trial
that may be slightly supportive of this finding of fact is the following: "I was going to
you and a few people to see if it was legal. And that's what I told him. I won't-none of
2

The inconsistency of Christensen's position is again highlighted. There is no reason
Brasher would need a multi-year lease for the water ifhe was required to purchase the
property in order for the lease to take effect (as Christensen has consistently asserted).
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this is good here today. (Emphasis added). [TT. 217:25 through 218: 14]. [See
Christensen Brief, p. 18]. The problem with this isolated and rambling statement is that
Christensen doesn't indicate what "it" is. There is no question that Christensen wanted to
take the Offer to Purchase to her family and attorney before accepting the sale of her
property-that is why she kept the Offer to Purchase in her possession and why Brasher
didn't pay her earnest money at the March 13, 2013 meeting. [Brasher Brief, pp. 22-23].
However, there is no evidence that Christensen required approval of her family or
attorney before accepting the 2013 WUA. In fact, Christensen accepted the check
tendered by Brasher and permitted Brasher to leave the March 13, 2013 meeting with the

i.J;)

executed WUA in hand.
Each of these three findings is subject to the "clearly erroneous" standard required
when an appellate court reviews a challenge to a finding of act. See Oneida/SLIC v.
Oneida Cold Storage & Wareshouse, 872 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Brasher

has properly marshaled the evidence and demonstrated that each of these three findings is
against the "clear weight of evidence."
IV.

Promissory estoppel is a viable cause of action because Christensen's own
testimony and actions demonstrate that the water use was not conditioned
upon Brasher purchasing Christensen's farm.

Christensen asserts that Brasher "has not really challenged" the trial court's
determination that "Christensen's promise to allow Brasher to draw water in 2013 was
conditioned upon Brasher purchasing the Farm." [Christensen Brief, p. 18]. This is a
patently untrue-Brasher thoroughly addresses this particular determination in his initial
Brief. [Brasher Brief, pp. 27-30]. As oft-noted, Christensen admitted in trial that the 2013
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WUA and the Offer to Purchase were "separate documents" and not dependent on each
other. [TT. 217:8-25]. Brasher confirmed that Christensen never told him that the water
lease was contingent upon her approving the Offer to Purchase. [TT. 137:16-25].
In her Brief, Christensen cites her own trial testimony in an attempt to establish
the conditional nature of the 2013 WUA. [Christensen Brief, pp.17-18]. However, a
review of this testimony only establishes that Christensen in her own mind may have felt
that the water use was conditional. None of her testimony as cited proves that she ever
spoke with Brasher about it or disclosed her thoughts on the matter.
Futhermore, the following arguments presented by Brasher in his initial Brief
confirm Brasher's argument that the 2013 WUA was not conditioned upon the sale of the
Farm:
(1)

The testimony at trial indicates that Christensen only told Brasher that she
need to discuss the Offer to Purchase (not the 2013 WUA) with her family
and attorney before agreeing to accept the sale of the Farm [Brasher Brief,
pp. 22-23].

(2)

According to the Offer to Purchase, the sale included 605.55 shares of class
"A" water and 175 shares of class "B" water-far in excess of the 215 class
"A" shares that Brasher leased under the terms of the 2013 WUA. This fact
is relevant because if the 2013 WUA was conditioned upon consummation
of the sale under the terms of the Offer to Purchase, Brasher would not
have needed a separate WUA/lease since he would have had more than
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enough water merely by purchasing Christensen's property. [Brasher Brief,
p. 29].

(3)

The Offer to Purchase anticipated a closing no later than December 1, 2013.
If permission to lease the water was conditioned on the purchase of the
Farm by Brasher, the 2013 WUA would necessarily have been held in
abeyance until closing had actually occurred up to December 1, 2013
thereby rendering the 2013 WUA useless during the entire 2013 irrigation
season. [Brasher Brief, p. 30].

(4)

Christensen openly manifested her acceptance of the offer by: (a) executing
the 2013 WUA during the March 13, 2013 meeting; (b) accepting the check
tendered by Brasher for the full lease price; (c) allowing Brasher to leave
the meeting with the 2013 WUA in his possession so Brasher could file the
WUA with HCIC; and (d) holding onto the check and not returning it to
Brasher until it was demanded in discovery during the litigation. [Brasher
Brief, p. 31].

(5)

The 2013 WUA incorporates specific timing for the payment of the valid
consideration. Brasher promised to tender payment for the upcoming
irrigation season no later than March 15th of each year. Additionally, the
payment term is definite as the check tendered by Brasher established the
premium price agreed upon of six dollars ($6.00) per share - the same
amount agreed to in 2012. [Brasher Brief, p. 31].
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Christensen argues in her Brief that because of the "conditional" nature of the
2013 WU A, a promissory estoppel claim cannot be supported and the promise to deliver
water was "nothing more than a preliminary negotiation." [Christensen Brief, p. 19].
This position, however, cannot be taken seriously given the following undisputed
facts: (1) the 2013 WUA incorporates specific timing for the payment of the valid
consideration; (2) the 2012 WUA (which Christensen did honor) was identical to the
2013 WUA; (3) the parties executed the 2013 WUA during the March 13, 2013 meeting;
(4) Christensen accepted the check tendered by Brasher for the full lease price; (5)
Christensen allowed Brasher to leave the meeting with the 2013 WUA in his possession
so Brasher could file the WUA with HCIC; (6) Christensen held onto the check; (7)
Christensen never actually told Brasher that the 2013 WUA was not valid unless her
purchased the Farm; (8) Brasher relied upon the signed/executed 2013 WUA and did not
attempt to secure an alternate water source, but filed it the same day (March 13, 2013)
after leaving the meeting. [Brasher Brief, pp. 30-32].
Based on these facts, the suggestion that Christensen and Brasher were merely
engaged in "preliminary negotiations" strains credulity.
Christensen also suggests that second element (required to establish promissory
estoppel) is also not met because the trial court determined that Christensen subjectively
believed the water lease was part of the Farm sale and did not intend to lease the water to
Brasher unless he purchased the Farm. Also, Christensen first realized that Brasher was
drawing on her water in late April/ May 2013 and then took steps to terminate Brasher' s
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use of the water. 3 [Christensen Brief, pp. 19-20]. Brasher has established ad nauseum that
Christensen did not view the 2013 WUA as dependent upon the purchase of the Farm.
Moreover, Christensen belated termination of the 2013 WUA does not mean that the
lease was conditional. As noted in the preceding paragraph, every action taken by
Christensen prior to the termination evidenced an intent to lease the requisite shares of
water-and Christensen was well-aware of the fact that those shares were essential for
Brasher' s operations.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Brasher respectfully request that the Court:
1.

Reverse the three specified findings of fact by the District Court on grounds of
clear error.

2.

Reverse the District Court's legal conclusion that the 2013 WUA, standing alone,
is not a contract.

3.

Reverse the District Court's legal conclusion that Christensen and Brasher never
had a "meeting of the minds" sufficient to form an oral contract.

4.

Reverse the District Court's legal conclusion that promissory estoppel is
inapplicable because Christensen required that Brasher purchase her property in
order for the 2013 WU A to be valid.

3

Of course, after Christensen decided that she wanted to raise the price of the Farm by
$100,000.00 and to keep back 100 shares of water, Brasher's 2013 WUA would likely be
problematic for any subsequent interested buyer-especially if (as Brasher asserts), the
lease was for a 5-year period. [Brasher Brief, p. 16, if63].
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5.

Reverse the District Court's legal conclusion that the parol evidence rule is
inapplicable to evidence related to the alleged "condition" that Brasher was
required to purchase Christensen's property in order to effectuate the 2013 WUA.
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